Tagged: “resentment”

I am wondering about this situation: One of my friends, Alex, was offended by another of my friends, James. In the process of working their way back to each other (and I was present for this), James also pointed out how Alex was partially at fault for their tensions and conflicts. I agree with James. Yet, Alex refuses to believe that he has done any wrong at all. How can we convince Alex that he is partially at fault?

The short answer is that you may not be able to convince Alex. I do think it is a good idea to point out, gently, Alex’s complicity in the tensions. Yet, his acceptance of this is his call. He seems to need time and may be in denial. Denial as a psychological defense can take time to weaken. If he feels even slightly guilty, then this is a good opening for him to explore the possibility of his contributing to the conflicts. If both James and you realize that denial takes time to dissolve, then your patience may pay off in a restored relationship.

For additional information, see Do I Have to Reconcile with the Other When I Forgive?

How can I convince my stubborn roommate that he needs to get counseling help so that  he can forgive his ex-girlfriend? He is distracted and very angry.

I admire your intention to help your roommate overcome his resentment. Resentment often can get so painful that it becomes the motivator to seek help in forgiving. Yet, this decision to forgive or not rests with your roommate. It is his call; it is his choice. You could gently ask him what the level of his emotional pain is. If he gives you a truthful answer that it is high, then you might suggest that you have a possible solution to that inner pain—Forgiveness Therapy. Even then, he needs the freedom to either accept or reject the suggestion. Does he truly know what it means to forgive? If he is misunderstanding what forgiveness is, then this could be an impediment to his seeking help.

For additional information, see Forgiveness Defined.

My friend, Doloris, is upset with one of her parents. I can see that she would benefit from forgiving. Yet, she will not listen. What do you suggest that I do?

You do not want to pressure Doloris into forgiving. At the same time, you do not necessarily want to ignore your friend who could be better off psychologically by considering forgiveness. I recommend that you be aware of Doloris’ inner pain. When she expresses that pain (as fatigue or bodily tensions or deep anger), you could focus on that pain and ask her if she has a way of reducing or eliminating that pain. If she has no effective strategies in mind, it is then that you might consider suggesting forgiving as a way to get rid of the pain. I have found that pain is a great motivator toward healing and forgiving is one path to that healing.

For additional information, see 8 Reasons to Forgive.

If a person seeks revenge instead of following the steps of forgiving and then that person reports great inner relief, could it be said that this is a form of forgiving? I say that because the revenge and forgiving both lead to the same end of feeling better.

Actually, no. Revenge-seeking and forgiving are entirely different. Even if they lead to a similar inner conclusion, we have to remember that the outward conclusion is radically different for revenge and forgiving. In getting revenge, the person may receive retaliation from the other, in which case the “feel good” scenario melts away. In forgiving, the person who gives love may receive love back. Even if this does not happen, at least the other person’s quest for retaliation may not be present any longer. We cannot confuse revenge and forgiving by focusing on outcomes only. As one final thought, the “feel good” experience in revenge might be very short-lived. Revenge does not necessarily lead to a cure for resentment, but only a temporary reprieve from it.

For additional information, see Forgiveness Defined.

The Common Good of Communities and the Need for Forgiveness: A View from Classical Greek Philosophy

A community is a single, whole entity, with a common purpose, made up of persons, each of whom is a single, whole entity (Maritain, 1994).  A community is not simply the sum total of the individuals in the community (a nominalist view).  Think of a symphonic community of musicians. There is a harmony of persons performing different activities and with different talents in the orchestra.  The group transcends any given part of the group (Wild, 1948).  A symphony orchestra is more than the violin section only.  Communities differ in their norms, beliefs, and actions (what Aristotle calls accidents).

Aristotelian realist philosophy states that communities have a common good (Aristotle, 1999/340 B.C.).  A common good is defined by Plato (2015/330 B.C.) in The Republic as persons growing in the Cardinal Virtues of justice, courage, wisdom, and temperance with these emphasized within the group. These four virtues, in Plato’s view, are not generated by opinion or feelings, but they naturally apply to all persons and all communities. These are understood by reason and chosen by the free will of each person.  In other words, the Cardinal Virtues are not forced upon us.

Let us, then, define these Cardinal Virtues: 1) Justice is offering one’s best to others and the community.  Kreeft (1992, p. 60) describes Platonic justice through the poetic image of music: one strives to be in harmony with others as all cooperate and play a beautiful societal tune. This is the central virtue according to Plato in The Republic.
2) Courage
is going ahead despite fear so that one can do one’s best even when it is difficult to do so.  3) Wisdom is knowing the right response at the right time without having a rule-book nearby.  4) Temperance is balance, avoiding too much or too little in all we do, including practicing the virtues, in pleasure seeking, and work.  In Book IV of his Republic, Plato (2015/330 B.C.) defends the view that all four of these Cardinal Virtues, together, help to mature individuals and to have a well-functioning community in which the greater good then benefits all. 

 As Wild (1948, p. 185) clarifies, the goal of the common good is human perfection for all in the community.  The common good of the community, which includes the good of each person, is considered higher than the individual good.  In other words, individuals can be in service to one another for the good of the other person and the good of the group. 

Now, and importantly for how forgiveness fits into the common good of the community, when people are treated unjustly by others, anger can ensue, which can develop into irritability (Stringaris, Vidal-Ribas, Brotman, & Leibenluft, 2017) and even to hatred.  Forgiving those who are unjust, then, can first reduce the anger, which in turn can reduce the desire for excessive recompense (in the case of justice), and the desire for reckless bravado (in the case of courage).  Without hatred, temperance can be restored, and the clear, rational thinking of wisdom can once again be present. If the common good is to be just, to work in harmony with others, then forgiveness can keep justice in balance, by first reducing toxic anger, and thus preserving the central Cardinal Virtue (justice) in communities. If this is true, then forgiveness needs to play a central part in the common good of communities.

If this is true, then forgiveness needs to be fostered in individuals, families, schools, workplaces, and places of worship……now.

Robert

• Aristotle. (1999/340 B.C.). Nicomachean ethics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Kreeft, P. (1992). Back to virtue. San Francisco: Ignatius Press.
• Maritan, J. (1994). The person and the common good. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
• Plato, translated by B. Jowett (2015/approximately 330 BC). The complete works of Plato/ the republic. Hastings, East Sussex, United Kingdom: Delphi Classics.
• Stringaris, A., Vidal-Ribas, P., Brotman, M.A., & Leibenluft, E. (2017). Practitioner review: Definition, recognition, and treatment challenges of irritability in young people. Journal of Child Psychology, 59, 721-739.
• Wild, J. (1948). Introduction to realistic philosophy. New York: Harper & Row.